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TORTS-LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE OWNER FOR NEGLIGENCE OF DRIVER-
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS OF AGENCY AND CONsENT-[Federal] .- Plaintiff
sued to recover for injuries caused by an automobile owned by defendant
but driven by another. Defendant testified that the driver had taken the
car without his knowledge, authority, or consent. A statute made an owner
of a motor vehicle liable for the negligence of a driver using the car with
his knowledge and consent, and made proof of ownership prima facie
evidence that the driver had the consent of the owner.1 The jury rendered
a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Held, that uncontradicted testimony by de-
fendant alone was sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption, and
that there should have been a directed verdict for defendant. Rutledge, J.,
dissented on the ground that, since the statute made proof of ownership
evidence of consent, it was proper to send the case to the jury to determine
the credibility of defendant. Rosenberg v. Murray.2
At common law the owner of an automobile is liable for the negligence
of a driver other than himself only if the driver is his agent acting within
the scope of his authority at the time of the accident.3 Because of the large
increase in automobile accidents in recent years, most of the states have
modified the common law by statute or by judicial decision. 4 Many juris-
dictions have adopted statutes which make an owner liable if the driver has
the owner's express or implied consent.5 In addition, some of these statutes
expressly make proof of ownership prima facie evidence that the driver had
the owner's consent and knowledge,6 while the remaining statutes, as inter-
preted, make proof of ownership the basis for a presumption of consent and
knowledge.7 The majority of jurisdictions retain the agency basis of liabil-
ity, but by decision have established that proof of ownership raises a pre-
sumption that the driver was the agent of the owner and was acting within
1. D. C. Code Supp. V (1939) tit. 6, sec. 255b.
2. (App. D. C. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 552.
3. 2 Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914) 1487, see. 1912n.
4. See Notes: (1926) 42 A. L. R. 898; (1931) 74 A. L. R. 951; (1919)
4 A. L. R. 361; (1929) 61 A. L. R. 866; (1933) 83 A. L. R. 878; (1934)
88 A. L. R. 174; (1935) 96 A. L. R. 634; (1938) 112 A. L. R. 416.
5. Cal. Codes (1937) Vehicle Code, see. 402; D. C. Code Supp. V (1939)
tit. 6, see. 255b; Iowa Code (1939) sec. 5037.09; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932)
c. 231 sec. 85A; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 4648; Minn. Mason's Stats.
(Supp. 1936) see. 2720-104; N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Pt. II, c. 71,
sec. 59; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 98, sec. 10; Tenn. Code (1932) sec. 2701.
See Notes: (1919) 4 A. L. R. 361; (1929) 61 A. L. R. 866; (1933) 83
A. L. R. 878; (1934) 88 A. L. R. 174; (1938) 112 A. L. R. 416. See
also Comment (1935) 19 Minn. L. R. 241, on effect of these statutes in
Michigan, Minnesota, and New York.
6. D. C. Code Supp. V (1939) tit. 6, see. 255b; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932)
c. 231, sec. 85A; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 98, see. 10; Tenn. Code (1932)
see. 2701.
7. Day v. General Petroleum Corp. (1939) 32 Cal. App. (2d) 220, 89 P.
(2d) 718; Mitchell v. Automobile Underwriters (1938) 225 Iowa 906, 281
N. W. 832; Pulford v. Mouw (1937) 279 Mich. 376, 272 N. W. 713; Behrens
v. Hawkeye Oil Co. (1922) 151 Minn. 478, 187 N. W. 605; St. Andrassy v.
Mooney (1933) 262 N. Y. 368, 186 N. E. 867.
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the scope of his authority.8 One state, Connecticut, has a statute expressly
raising this presumption.2
These presumptions are binding in the absence of rebutting testimony.' 0
They are not evidence, however, and it is the general rule that the pre-
sumptions disappear as soon as any substantial evidence to the contrary is
introduced." If the rebutting testimony is unequivocal and uncontradicted,
the court may direct a verdict for the defendant. 2 New York and Wash-
ington have held that the testimony of interested witnesses is insufficient to
overcome the presumption conclusively, and that such cases must go to the
jury.8 In Connecticut, where the burden of rebutting the presumption is
placed on the defendant by statute, it is held that the jury must determine
the credibility of the defendant's witnesses.14 Missouri, however, holds that
the defendant's own uncontradicted testimony conclusively rebuts the pre-
sumption." In Massachusetts and Rhode Island, which have statutes like
that involved in the principal case, making proof of ownership Prima facie
evidence of consent, it has been held that the truth of the controverting
evidence is for the jury and that it is usually error to direct a verdict for
defendant.26
8. William E. Harden, Inc. v. Harden (Ala. 1940) 197 So. 94; Manion v.
Waybright (1938) 59 Idaho 643, 86 P. (2d) 181; Home Laundry Co. v.
Cook (1939) 277 Ky. 8, 125 S. W. (2d) 763; McDowell, Pyle & Co. v.
Magazine Service (1933) 164 Md. 170, 164 Atl. 148; Ross v. St. Louis Dairy
Co. (1936) 339 Mo. 982, 98 S. W. (2d) 717; Kavanaugh v. Wheeling (1940)
175 Va. 105, 7 S. E. (2d) 125. See Notes: (1919) 4 A. L. R. 361; (1929)
61 A. L. R. 866; (1933) 83 A. L. R. 878; (1934) 88 A. L. R. 174; (1938)
112 A. L. R. 416.
9. Conn. Gen. Stats. (Supp. 1935) sec. 1661c.
10. Pulford v. Mouw (1937) 279 Mich. 376, 272 N. W. 713.
11. Flores v. Tucson Gas, Electric L. & P. Co. (1939) 54 Ariz. 460, 97 P.(2d) 206; Union Trust Co. v. American Commercial Car Co. (1922) 219
Mich. 557, 189 N. W. 23; Ross v. St. Louis Dairy Co. (1936) 339 Mo. 982,
98 S. W. (2d) 717; Saltas v. Affleck (Utah 1940) 102 P. (2d) 493; Kava-
naugh v. Wheeling (1940) 175 Va. 105, 7 S. E. (2d) 125; Laurent v. Plain
(1938) 229 Wis. 75, 281 N. W. 660. Oregon by statute makes presumptions
indirect evidence and therefore the question must go to the jury. Ore. Laws(1920) sec. 793. Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Service Co. (1930) 136 Ore. 1,
294 Pac. 588 (1931), 297 Pac. 1050, 74 A. L. R. 944.
12. Walsh v. Rosenberg (App. D. C. 1935) 81 F. (2d) 559; Manion v.
Waybright (1938) 59 Idaho 643, 86 P. (2d) 181; Mitchell v. Automobile
Underwriters (1938) 225 Iowa 906, 281 N. W. 832; McDowell, Pyle & Co.
v. Magazine Service (1933) 164 Md. 170, 164 Atl. 148; Union Trust Co. v.
American Commercial Car Co. (1922) 219 Mich. 557, 189 N. W. 23; Ross v.
St. Louis Dairy Co. (1936) 339 Mo. 982, 98 S. W. (2d) 717; Kavanaugh v.
Wheeling (1940) 175 Va. 105, 7 S. E. (2d) 125.
13. Piwowarski v. Cornwell (1937) 273 N. Y. 226, 7 N. E. (2d) 111;
Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co. (1933) 172 Wash. 396, 20 P. (2d) 39;
McMullen v. Warren Motor Co. (1933) 174 Wash. 454, 25 P. (2d) 99.
14. Conn. Gen. Stats. (Supp. 1935) sec. 1661c; Lockwood v. Helfant(1940) 126 Conn. 584, 13 A. (2d) 136.
15. Frohoff v. Adams (Mo. App. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 615.
16. Thomes v. Meyer Store Inc. (1929) 268 Mass. 587, 168 N. E. 178;
Legarry v. Finn Motor Sales (Mass. 1939) 23 N. E. (2d) 1011; Hill v.
Cabral (R. I. 1938) 2 A. (2d) 482.
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The majority of the court in the instant case took the position that the
statute creates a mere presumption despite the fact that the statute ex-
pressly states that proof of ownership shall be prima facie evidence of con-
sent. The court also overlooked the fact that the other jurisdictions with
similar statutes have construed them consistently as requiring cases like
the instant one to go to the jury. It would appear, therefore, that the dis-
senting opinion of Judge Rutledge is more in line with established principles.
D.C.
TRUSTS-POWER OF TRusTEE--INVESTMENT IN STOCK OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
Tios-[Missouri]:.-At the instance of the life beneficiary of a testamen-
tary trust, the plaintiff trust company as trustee sought instructions with
respect to permissible investment of the trust funds. The estate was in-
vested almost wholly in railroad, public utility, industrial, and first mort-
gage real estate bonds. The annual income from them was less than 3%
of their market value. The life beneficiary asked that about 20% of the
estate be invested in such common and preferred stocks as the trustee
might deem desirable investments. The pertinent clause of the will gave the
trustee power to sell and to "invest the proceeds in such property or se-
curities as in its judgment" would "yield a safe an4 regular income and
to change investments and make new investments from time to time as it
may deem necessary and proper." The lower court decreed that the trustee
was authorized to invest "in corporate preferred and common stocks; pro-
vided, however, that it" should "exercise reasonable care in the selection of
such stocks as" were "to be purchased." From this decree, the remainder-
man under the trust appealed. In the St. Louis Court of Appeals, this
judgment was affirmed. Toberman v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.'
In another recent case the trustees of a charitable trust came into court
asking instructions as to investment and approval of investments already
made. The question was whether investments in the common and preferred
stocks of private corporations were proper. The lower court decided that
such investments were proper. In the Missouri Supreme Court, this judg-
ment was affirmed. Rand v. McKitti*k.
That the trustee's loyalty is divided between life tenant and remainder-
man, between producing income and conserving capital, is clear. Stock is
one of the most common forms of income-producing investment. However,
authority is divided as to whether the trustee with general powers of in-
vestment may purchase stock.3 The New York rule is that he has no such
power.4 On the other hand, by the Massachusetts rule, he has. 5 In many
1. (Mo. App. 1940) 140 S. W. (2d) 68. Another issue was whether the
trustee might invest in a common trust fund. It was held that such was
also a permissible investment.
2. (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 29. See Comment (1940) 9 U. Kan. City
L. Rev. 44.
3. For a collection of cases pro and con see 2 Scott, The Law of Trusts
(1939) sec. 227.11.
4. King v. Talbot (1869) 40 N. Y. 76.
5. Harvard College v. Amory (1830) 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446.
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